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Abstract 
 
This paper addresses how China’s use of sharp power has become the method with which to 
maintain its policy of non-interference. Firstly, I will briefly discuss the history of China’s non-
interference policy and how its quest to become a major responsible power has led to its use of 
new influence methods abroad. Secondly, I will analyze the new influence methods, which have 
been described as sharp power, used by the Chinese Communist Party to exert political 
influence in the world today. In addition, I will highlight the main departments within the Chinese 
Communist Party responsible for influencing narratives abroad and the strategies used by each 
department. Lastly, I will use Australia and Argentina as case studies to detail how the Chinese 
Communist Party uses sharp power methods within these countries. I outline China’s strategy 
as something demanding greater international attention but not at the risk of creating paranoia 
or encouraging nations to sever ties with China. 
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I. Introduction 
 Since the time of Mao Zedong, Chinese officials have promoted a foreign policy of non-
interference. China has used its policy of non-interference to gain influence in Africa, South 
America, and Southeast Asia. China, as most states do, seeks power within the international 
community. Power is the “means of obtaining desired outcomes” (Nye, 2004). In the past, in 
order to obtain power internationally, Chinese officials coupled non-interference with soft power 
mechanisms. Soft power is influence through attraction (Nye, 2004). However, with the onset of 
the 21st century the stance of the international community concerning non-interference shifted. 
Non-interference is no longer a sacrosanct policy which exclusively dictates interactions 
between states. There are instances in which the international community has recognized the 
limits of non-interference and sacrificed it in favor of protecting and promoting human rights. 
China, however, has held firm to its policy of non-interference. As such, it has been criticized by 
Western nations as favoring non-interference at the expense of human rights. China’s stance in 
opposition to the international community has meant that it’s influence globally has lessened. 
However, it has not renounced its policy of non-interference but neither has it been willing to 
accept diminished influence in the world. Therefore, China’s solution, to maintaining its policy of 
non-interference while strengthening its influence in the world, is sharp power. Sharp power, 
coined by the National Endowment for Democracy, describes the way in which authoritarian 
regimes, specifically China and Russia, perforate the media and political spheres of other 
nations in order to manipulate and influence public and governmental perceptions (Walker, 
2017).  
 Before outlining the sections of this paper, I will give a brief example of sharp power so as 
to contextualize what I will later be exploring within Australia and Argentina. One instance of the 
use of sharp power is the case of self-censorship by Cambridge University Press and Springer 
Nature, both major international publishing companies. In 2017, these two companies removed 
and censored content, at the behest of Chinese agencies, from subscribers in the People’s 
Republic of China (Tiffert, 2017). After negative publicity, Cambridge University Press restored 
the content to its China Quarterly journal and Journal of Asian Studies (Tiffert, 2017). However, 
Springer Nature stood by its removal of 1,000 titles claiming that it was merely the price of doing 
business in China (Tiffert, 2017). While the censorship in these circumstances only affected 
subscribers in China, it does show how the Chinese agents are able to influence independent 
international actors. William Callahan, professor of international relations at the London School 
of Economics and Political Science said that China’s “increased power means that the debate 
has shifted from Westerners being concerned about censorship in China to all of us being 
concerned about how China is censoring what we’re doing all around the world” (Bothwell, 
2017). With this statement, Professor Callahan speaks to the importance of recognizing China’s 
increased power within the world.  
 Firstly, in this paper I will analyze China’s policy of non-interference in foreign affairs. 
Next, I will detail how the change within the international community has threatened China’s 
influence in the world and thereby caused Chinese officials to develop new methods of 
influence. In the second part of this paper, I explain how China’s use of sharp power has been 
manifested in the political spheres of Australia and Argentina. I have chosen Australia because 
the evidence of the Chinese Communist Party’s influence in Australia’s politics is undisputed 
and because it has caused much controversy within the country and internationally. Secondly, I 
have chosen Argentina because the CCP’s influence there is in its beginning stages and 
therefore provides an interesting case to follow and monitor for future research. This paper does 
not address the numerous instances of sharp power used by the CCP in other nations of the 
world simply because the scope is too broad. However, by using Australia and Argentina as 
case studies I argue that China has developed sharp power methods of influence because it 
seeks to bolster its power in the world, while still maintaining its policy of non-interference.  
 
II. Literature Review 
 Scholars such as Samuel S. King, Richard Aidoo and Steve Hess (2015), Mu Ren (2013), 
and Yizhou Wang (2017) argue that China’s foreign policy is defined by certain events and key 
leaders from its past. These authors provide a clear picture of the development of the non-
interference policy in the China of the past and in the China of the present. Richard Aidoo and 
Steve Hess (2015) outline the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and their importance in 
China’s development initiatives, particularly in Africa. Mu Ren (2013) emphasizes the ways in 
which China’s years of national humiliation have re-enforced its policy of non-interference. 
These authors also provide evidence for the apparent contradiction within China’s policy of non-
interference and how it is manifest in relations with the international community. In regard to soft 
power techniques used by the CCP, James Jiann Hua To (2014), Anne Marie-Brady (2015), 
Angliviel de la Beaumelle (2017), Jian Wang (2011), and Kingsley Edney (2014) address the 
different tactics by which the CCP engages countries to influence international perspectives 
abroad. To (2014) speaks to the importance of overseas Chinese in helping to propagate the 
CCP’s foreign policy initiatives whether that be through direct or indirect influence. Marie-Brady 
(2015) and Angliviel de la Beaumelle (2017) identify the specific departments and groups in the 
CCP which are involved in foreign propaganda work. They also specify the ways in which their 
agendas come to fruition all over the world. Jian Wang (2011) speaks to the recent change by 
the CCP in utilizing different forms of communication to influence the outside world. Lastly, 
Edney (2014) discusses how the CCP’s international power is linked to domestic political 
cohesion. He links the latter’s success to the former through his many examples of the CCP’s 
diverse approaches to propaganda. Finally, Christopher Walker, Jessica Ludwig, and Juan 
Pablo Cardenal (2017) introduce the notion of sharp power. Walker and Ludwig (2017) provide 
a basic definition of this recently identified phenomenon in foreign relations while Pablo 
Cardenal (2017) traces the CCP’s use of sharp power in Argentina. Since sharp power was only 
coined as a term in December 2017, very few authors have tackled the way in which the CCP 
uses sharp power. None have yet linked China’s foreign policy of non-interference to its current 
use of sharp power. Therefore, this essay traces China’s foreign policy rhetoric and action in the 
international community in an effort to discover the contradictory and clandestine nature of its 
current foreign policy, which uses non-interference as a guise to carry out increasing methods of 
sharp power in order to shape and sway international political policies.   
 
III. A Brief History of China and Non-interference 
 Non-interference is not a principle exclusive to the CCP. On the contrary, the notion of 
non-interference comes first and foremost from the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. The treaty, 
which ended the Thirty Years’ War, laid the foundation for the international system of today. It 
defined state sovereignty and the importance of the state’s power in maintaining exclusive 
authority within its territory (Hassan, 2006). Before the treaty was signed, state sovereignty was 
not universally accepted. The concept of a state was in its infancy as feudalism influenced 
interactions more so than state power. The principles set forth in the Treaty of Westphalia have 
guided state interactions and disputes on territorial sovereignty up to the present day. The 
notion of Sovereignty was reinforced with the signing of the UN Charter in 1948. Article 2(7) of 
the UN Charter specifies that the UN will not “intervene in matters which are essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of any state”, save in cases outlined in Chapter VII (Charter, 1948). 
With the signing of the UN Charter, it continued to uphold state sovereignty and condemn 
interference in domestic matters, all of which were first outlined through the Treaty of 
Westphalia.  
 The first instance of China’s stance on non-interference on paper came from article five of 
the Treaty of Friendship Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the People’s Republic of 
China and the Soviet Union in February 1950. Under the treaty, China and the USSR agreed to 
assist each other in the event of a future Japanese invasion in their territories. Article five 
stipulates that each party will cooperate economically in the spirit of “mutual respect for the 
national sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of the 
contracting parties” (Treaty of Friendship, 1950). The principle of non-interference was later 
expanded in a joint statement between the People’s Republic of China and India in 1954. It 
concerned border disputes between the countries. Within the document, China laid out the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. These principles would guide all future bilateral treaties and 
agreements between China and its partners in the world. The five principles include: non-
interference, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, equality and mutual benefit, 
mutual non-aggression, and peaceful coexistence (Aidoo, 2015). According to the CCP, non-
interference in internal affairs means not partaking or influencing a country in regard to “the 
overall situation of the people’s livelihood, such as political system, security arrangement and 
governance, and leadership selection” (Wang, 2017). Non-interference has guided China’s 
actions, or lack thereof, in international affairs up to the present day.  
 While the UN and China both held the principle of non-intervention as sacrosanct in the 
years after the adoption of the UN Charter, the UN has sacrificed it in cases when humanitarian 
crises have called for greater leniency. There is a growing “transition from a culture of sovereign 
impunity to a culture of national and international accountability” in the UN (R2P, 2001). In 
essence, there has been a shift from absolute protection of national sovereignty to a push for 
international accountability when a nation fails to protect its people. This is manifest in the ways 
in which the UN tries to balance the instances necessitating a breach of national sovereignty 
with the sovereign rights of the state; for example, the creation of the International Criminal 
Court, the non-binding Responsibility to Protect commitment, the Convention on the Protection 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and the growing use of UN peacekeeping troops in 
the world. Consider the Responsibility to Protect, a non-binding political commitment by UN 
members (R2P, 2001). With its endorsement in 2005, UN members agreed to react to a state’s 
inability or unwillingness to stop widespread violations of human rights, “by imposing sanctions, 
initiating international prosecutions and, in extreme cases, intervening with military force” (Teitt, 
2011). The Responsibility to Protect report states that “it is only when national systems of justice 
either cannot or will not act to judge crimes against humanity that universal jurisdiction and other 
international options should come into play” (R2P, 2001). In essence, UN member states 
acknowledge that there exist circumstances, albeit few, in which international action is 
necessary to stop intrastate atrocities. While the international community is more willing to 
consider action and possibly intervention in the case of humanitarian crises, it does not follow 
that the it accepts intervention. Certainly, military intervention is the last resort and for the most 
part such a sentiment is shared by most states. Therefore, the steps taken by the UN to outline 
criteria for action, when a state cannot or will not protect its people, are not justifications for 
intervention. Rather, these steps are designed to protect vulnerable people within nations from 
grave human rights abuses perpetuated by their own governments. The principles of national 
sovereignty and non-interference will continue to be guiding principles of the international 
community in part because they are at the foundation of modern international relations theory 
and practice and in part because they assist in maintaining international stability and peace.    
 Compared to the United Nations, Chinese officials have been firmer in maintaining their 
principle of non-interference. In fact, China’s stance on non-interference has remained relatively 
unchanged throughout its history. The century of humiliation at the hands of international 
aggressors has shaped China’s foreign policy doctrine. This period, from 1839 to 1949, was a 
time in which imperialist powers from the West and Japan sought to control China. During the 
Mao Zedong era, Chinese rulers saw the principle of non-intervention as a safeguard against 
colonial and imperialistic agendas consistently imposed upon the country from the outside 
world. The struggle for sovereignty and state independence became the dominate diplomatic 
strategy for China (Ren, 2013). Mao cast China as a victim of international aggression and so 
used China’s plight to bolster nationalistic fervor (Carlson, 2005). In this way, non-interference 
became a vital part of China’s identity. In 1949, Mao Zedong said at the First Plenary Session of 
the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, “Ours will no longer be a nation subject 
to insult and humiliation. We have stood up” (Zedong, 1949). Since then, while China no longer 
presents itself as a victim, the basic principle has been kept alive and used to justify its distrust 
of the international community and its overall stance on sovereignty (Gonzalez-Vicente, 2015).  
 In speeches and discussions at the UN, Chinese officials have maintained sovereignty 
and non-interference as firm principles. For instance, Chinese representative Li Yongsheng, 
stressed the importance of sovereignty at the 8132nd meeting of the UN Security Council in 
2017. In his statement, he made it clear that despite international consensus to intervene in the 
domestic affairs of Sudan, the CCP first and foremost supported sovereignty. “China believes 
that the international community should fully respect the… sovereignty of the Sudan” (UN 8132, 
2017). Chinese officials argue that China has the right, as a permanent UN Security Council 
member, “to safeguard its [state sovereignty] legitimacy, justice, and effectiveness in the 
international community” (Wang, 2017). In addition, China’s century of humiliation has cultivated 
the commonly held belief in China that intervention is synonymous with immorality (Ren, 2013). 
This period in history has contributed to China’s strong stance on non-interference. Western 
powers preying upon weaker powers is characteristic of Western imperialism and Chinese 
officials have consistently directed policy in order to separate themselves from the aggressive, 
interventionist stance of the Western world, most notably that of the USA. In fact, at the 19th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China, in October 2017, Xi Jinping stated that 
China will “oppose acts that…interfere in the internal affairs of others as well as the practice of 
the strong bullying the weak” (Jinping, pg.53, 2017).  In addition, defense of sovereignty has 
become a way in which China can separate its domestic and foreign policies. Chinese officials 
label international criticism of China’s internal affairs as interference, and this stance is 
legitimized by its policy of non-interference (Kim, 1994). Therefore, the emphasis on sovereignty 
provides a shield behind which the CCP does not experience the need to justify its internal 
affairs to the international community. 
 While non-interference has garnered domestic support in China, it has also been attractive 
to many developing nations because it serves as an alternative to Western conditional 
investment. The Beijing Consensus, an informal term for the political and economic policies of 
the People’s Republic of China being replicated abroad, does not withhold investment or trade 
partnerships from nations which lack democratic political governance. China’s commitment to 
non-interference has facilitated the proliferation of Chinese business ventures and influence in 
less developed nations all over the world. Dr. Jorge Malena, the director of Contemporary 
Chinese studies at the Universidad del Salvador, echoes the sentiments of many within his 
country when he explains that the Chinese model is “an alternative superior to the Western 
model in cultural, political and economic matters” (Schelp and Saravia, 2016). Thereby, non-
interference, by virtue of itself, has allowed China to enter the economic markets of many 
nations in Africa and Latin America. This is because states prefer signing onto non-conditional 
trade and investment deals with China rather than agreements with nations of the West laden 
with conditionalities. China’s increased involvement in these regions places it in the perfect 
position to exert present and future influence.  
 As the CCP continues to do business with Africa, South America, and Southeast Asia, it 
also seeks to become a respected and responsible power in the world. In order to gain this 
status, China needs to bolster its influence. Domestically, Chinese officials see China as a 
responsible power as evidence by Xi Jinping’s speech at the 19th National Congress in 2017, 
“China will continue to play its part as a major and responsible country” (Jinping, pg.54, 2017). 
However, internationally, many nations are yet to consider China a responsible nation because 
of China’s hesitancy to alter its policy of non-interference, especially when instances of 
humanitarian crises call for the safeguarding of human rights over national sovereignty. Due to 
the changing perspective on non-interference within the international community, China’s soft 
power efforts have been less effective. Chinese officials, therefore, have the task of bolstering 
China’s image through greater influence within the world. However, by virtue of non-
interference, Chinese officials have to tread carefully in seeking influence because such overt 
efforts would contradict China’s policy of non-interference. Therein lies the task of Chinese 
officials and China’s foreign propaganda departments—to increase China’s influence in the 
world without undermining its policy of non-interference. Therefore, in an effort to appear faithful 
to its policy, China has within the last 15 years used silent mechanisms of intervention to 
influence nations within the international community (Shitong, 2011). These silent mechanisms 
of intervention have become known as sharp power. 
 
IV. Evolution from Soft Power to Sharp Power in China 
  China’s foreign policy evolution from employing soft power to sharp power has been one 
of seamless transition. In 2007, President Hu Jintao gave an important address at the 17th 
annual Party of the Congress. In his speech, he accepted Joseph Nye’s term of soft power, 
stressing the importance of increasing China’s soft power efforts abroad (Jintao, 2007). His 
speech signaled the beginning of a new phase of foreign policy, emphasizing Chinese 
propaganda on a larger scale. Before proceeding, it is important to contextualize soft power. In 
his 1990 book, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, Joseph Nye coined 
the term soft power. Nye claimed that, with the “growing erosion of state sovereignty, the 
economic interdependence of states, creation of new communication channels and 
technologies, and the importance of non-state actors, the effectiveness of hard power has 
decreased” (Nye, 2004). Hard power is the use of coercive, often military force by a state 
against another state for some intended outcome (Nye, 2004). Soft power on the other hand, 
which Nye argues is more apparent and applicable in post-World War Two international 
relations, is persuasion in the form of values or cultural mechanisms (Nye, 2004). According to 
Nye, a state relies in part on the attractiveness of its culture and values to influence or change 
perceptions in other states (Nye, 2004). He has been critical of both the Chinese and Russian 
manifestations of soft power. His definition of soft power centers on the efforts of civil society, 
the private sector, and individuals as the main proponents. The CCP’s use of soft power 
mechanisms are directly overseen and promoted by government agencies, most notable of 
which is the State Council Information Office (Nye, 2015). In 2007, Hu Jintao’s China began to 
invest in China’s broader definition of soft power mechanisms in order to strengthen its national 
power. However, as specified by Nye, the Chinese method of promoting soft power is 
exclusively controlled by the government. When Xi Jinping took over as general secretary of the 
Chinese Communist Party in 2012, he broadened further China’s use of international 
propaganda and soft power. Xi, unlike Jintao, has sought not only to enhance China’s national 
power, but also to promote China as a new global power. It is only in the era of Xi that the CCP 
has overtly espoused its desire to be a strong global power, something which Hu never publicly 
asserted.  
 In Introduction: China’s Search of Soft Power, Jian Wang stresses that the credibility of 
China’s international soft power efforts are undermined by the lack of freedom enjoyed by its 
domestic citizenry (Wang, 2011). This is similar to Nye’s acknowledgement of the lack of soft 
power coming from the private sector. Zhao and Tan, both Chinese analysts, claim that China’s 
soft power efforts to increase its international influence are unlikely to succeed if the CCP does 
not get rid of its “centrally-supplied ideas and societal values and entrainment” and focus upon 
the trends being created at the grassroots levels (Litao, 2007). China’s domestic control is 
linked to its policy of non-interference because non-interference means that outside nations 
have little claim to intervene in the domestic affairs of China. Not only has the international 
community’s move away from non-interference diminished China’s influence in the world but the 
domestic restrictions within China have also caused many states to question China’s claim of 
being a major responsible power. Thereby, China’s soft power efforts have become less 
effective because nations are unable to reconcile a highly controlled and censored society with 
the qualities of a responsible power.  
 When Xi Jinping came into power he sought to increase China’s power internationally. 
However, this caused a dilemma for Chinese officials. Either they had to accept the reality that 
influencing an international audience to perceive China positively was lessened by China’s 
domestic policies, or they had to allow for greater transparency in China’s domestic sphere. As 
evidence today, China has accepted neither outcome. Instead, Chinese officials have taken 
steps to ensure control domestically while seeking to legitimize China’s voice internationally. 
However, the actions of Chinese officials in seeking influence cannot be perceived by the 
international community as a violation of China’s long policy of non-interference. Therefore, 
these actions have taken shape in the form of sharp power. The intended and often actual 
result, which I will address in section VII more fully, is that nations deal favorably with China in 
terms of trade, diplomatic favors, international support and the like. China’s use of sharp power 
allows it to covertly shape public and governmental perceptions for greater influence. China 
need not focus on enhancing the credibility of its domestic media when its use of sharp power 
hides its role in shaping international media and politics. Its use of sharp power also allows it to 
appear as though independent international actors support its policies. It is important to note, 
however, that not every attempt by the CCP to change global perceptions are mechanisms of 
sharp power. For instance, China employs soft power when it helps sponsor a Chinese new 
year’s celebration in Argentina and invites political leaders to attend. This and many other 
examples of soft power by China are legitimate and should be welcomed by other nations. 
However, when an ‘independent’ businessman, actually an affiliate of the CCP, bribes a 
politician into supporting its stance in the South China Sea, then that is a form of sharp power 
(McKenzie, 2017). In the previous instance, there is no visible or direct link from the 
independent businessman to the CCP, and so information is manipulated. Chinese officials use 
sharp power mechanisms for three reasons, of which I will discuss below. Firstly, to safeguard 
domestic security. Secondly, to promote and disseminate a positive image of itself to the rest of 
the world and lastly, to diminish and/or silence voices which portray it in a negative light. 
 Firstly, Chinese officials use sharp power to safeguard domestic stability. Domestic 
stability is highly important to the CCP especially with its large population of 1.3 billion people. 
Dissidents within only serve to undermine its power and threaten China’s growth and stability. It 
is an undisputed fact that the CCP has extensive control over the flow of ideas within China, as 
reflected by the recent statistical categorization of China as a ‘not free’ nation, or a score of 
14/100 (lower numbers indicating greater suppression of freedom by the state) by Freedom 
House for its 2018 report on Freedom in the World (Freedom House report). The report by 
Freedom House details how the CCP has tightened its control on media, online speech, 
religious groups, and civil society associations within the country (Freedom House report). 
However, Chinese citizens are not completely barred from communicating with the international 
community or traveling abroad to visit family. With such possibilities still open to Chinese 
citizens, they are likely to encounter negative opinions of CCP rule outside China. Dialogues 
contrary to CCP official propaganda have the potential to threaten the legitimacy of the CCP. If, 
however, the CCP is able to influence and effect control of dialogues abroad, it is better able to 
ensure domestic approval and thereby domestic stability. In addition, China does not need to 
focus on enhancing the credibility of its domestic media to ensure the credibility of its 
international media if so-called independents, who are actually backed by the CCP, support its 
rule. The clandestine investments and negotiations with international media organizations and 
governmental officials by Chinese officials is key to China becoming more powerful globally.  
 Secondly, it uses sharp power to enhance the way the international community views it, 
ultimately hoping to be viewed as a prosperous and responsible nation. It uses methods of 
indirect association with individuals and organizations in the international community to 
legitimize its role and efforts in the world.  
 Lastly, the CCP seeks to silence negative views of China through covert influence. Not 
only does China seek to appear benevolent through the eyes of the international community, it 
also seeks to squash potentially harmful views of itself coming from the West. Negative 
portrayals of the CCP within media and governmental spheres threaten China’s rise to 
becoming a major responsible power. As astutely stated by Joseph Nye, “a strong narrative is a 
source of power” (Nye, 2018). Certainly, there are many other factors, economic prowess 
among them, which must be taken into account when defining a major global power. However, 
for China to become a leading responsible power in this world it must focus primarily upon its 
image, as it has already attainted economic legitimacy. Therefore, if China is able to increase 
the dissemination of its own narrative to the international community, it can very easily become 
a major responsible power. Lessening the competing stories surrounding its initiatives and 
policies will go a long way to ensure this future success.     
V. Argument 
 Sharp power is the new method used by Chinese officials to influence perspectives 
abroad while preventing contradictions to its non-interference policy. It maintains this policy 
more as a warning to the international community to stay out of its internal affairs than as a pillar 
of its foreign policy. The question then becomes, why does the CCP hold onto this policy and 
create new methods of influence, in the form of sharp power, when it could instead influence 
more overtly? There exist two possible reasons for China’s adherence to its policy of non-
interference.  
 Firstly, the principle of non-interference is the major foundation for its relations with 
developing nations. Non-interference distinguishes the Beijing model from the Western model of 
international investment and development. Developing nations are more likely to deal with 
China because China forms bilateral partnerships as opposed to conditional and top-down deals 
offered by many Western nations. Thereby, non-interference bolsters the view that China is a 
reliable bilateral partner. Sacrificing this policy would only undermine its international 
development efforts.  
 Secondly, it legitimizes China’s claim to attaining the position of a responsible major 
power. It is able to use sharp power techniques without much fear of international 
condemnation, at least initially, because its non-interference policy negates the possibility that it 
would engage in other nations affairs. It silences those claiming Chinese interference in their 
states by swiftly reminding the world of its policy of non-interference. In addition, if China is 
consistently viewed as a nation which does not force itself into the domestic affairs of other 
nations, then it is more likely to be seen as a peaceful and non-imperialistic power, in direct 
contrast to the image of the United States.  
 It is important, however, not to over-react in the face of China’s changing use from soft 
power into sharp power. Nations should not restrict all of China’s efforts at influence in their 
countries, because soft power techniques are beneficial in maintaining peace. Cultural 
exchanges, festivals, language courses, etc. are important ways for open dialogue to take place 
between China and other nations. The international community would be doing itself and China 
a disservice by cutting off every form of influence from China. In fact, in today’s globalized 
society it is impossible to prevent China from influencing other nations’ societies. However, 
governments and leaders must be more aware of the changing methods in China’s soft power 
mechanisms. They must consider whether a certain form of influence is a tactic of soft power or 
more a method of sharp power. Openness and transparency in media and political spheres are 
the tools necessary to identify methods of sharp power. In this way, as Nye mentions, 
democracies have the advantage (Nye, 2018). Greater access to information will serve to 
expose instances in which the CCP manipulates information and pushes its policy agenda in a 
clandestine manner as opposed to those instances of genuine soft power.  
 
VI. Chinese Communist Party’s Methods of Sharp Power 
 China perforates political spheres to promote policy outcomes favorable to itself. China 
benefits from the openness of the International community, specifically the openness found in 
many emerging democracies. China uses the democratic platforms of other countries, in which 
diverse narratives and views are not restricted, to influence policy. Its membership in 
international organizations, such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and 
the World Trade Organization allow Chinese officials to access markets and people while at the 
same time restricting and monitor the flow of information domestically. China participates in the 
international community but creates its own set of rules with which to sway outcomes. Granted, 
other nations do the same, but the methods which China is able to use in influencing narratives 
is distinct. These methods being sharp power. In addition, unlike the vast majority of nations in 
the international community, China has a very controlled domestic society. Therefore, the 
eagerness of Chinese officials to engage in and influence the domestic affairs of other nations is 
contrary to the way in which it restricts other nations from influencing its domestic sphere.  
 China’s influence in the political spheres of other nations begins with the oversight 
committee known as the CCP Central Office of Propaganda (OFP), more broadly known as the 
State Council Information Office (SCIO) (Marie-Brady, 2015). The SCIO oversees the work of 
the CCP’s international propaganda organization known as the United Front Work Department 
(UFWD). The UFWD plays an essential part in promoting the agenda of the CCP. It serves to 
reach out and guide key individuals and groups within and outside of China to “accept CCP rule, 
endorse its legitimacy, and help achieve key party aims” (Kuo, 2018). The UFWD is made up of 
offices, bureaus, and subordinate units. The nine bureaus specialize in a particular geographical 
location or subject area abroad. Xi Jinping himself oversees the Leading Small Group of the 
United Front Work Department, the highest level of UFWD work. The UFWD extends its 
influence via overseas Chinese nationals and influential leaders in business and politics, who 
have become known as ‘friends of China’, and encourages them to promote CCP agendas and 
policies within their own countries. The work of the UFWD has been revitalized under Xi Jinping 
(Marie-Brady, 2015). In September 2014, at the 65th birthday of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference, Xi Jinping gave a speech stressing the growing importance of the 
work of the UFWD. He referred to the organization’s work as a “magic weapon” for the 
rejuvenation of China (Angliviel de la Beaumelle, 2017). At that same conference a year later, Xi 
Jinping spoke about the significant changes in China’s situation and mission, saying “the larger 
the change, the more the United Front under the ‘new situation’ needs to be developed, the 
more the United Front work needs to be carried out” (Angliviel de la Beaumelle, 2017). Lastly, 
he equated the work of the UFWD to that of the CCP by saying, “united front work is party work” 
(Angliviel de la Beaumelle, 2017). Xi has substantially increased the attention and resources 
given to the UFWD as its work is now central to the aims of the CCP. Precise figures for the 
amount of money invested in foreign propaganda work are difficult to come by, however, 
international reports have put estimates at around $7 billion to $10 billion for the year of 2015 
(Marie-Brady, 2015). However, these figures are only representative of the money spent on soft 
power efforts abroad. They do not account for the money invested in sharp power activities. In 
comparison, the United States spent around $666 million on soft power efforts in 2015 (Nye, 
2015). While the United States relies more on its allure though cultural mechanisms, it still 
spends conservatively six billion three hundred and thirty-four million dollars less on public 
diplomacy than China. Despite clear knowledge of the exact amount of money spent by the 
CCP on foreign propaganda efforts, it is clear that the CCP is investing heavily in the 
development of foreign propaganda, so more than any other country in the world. 
 One of the many ways in which CCP officials increase China’s influence in the world 
arena is through Chinese nationals and ‘friends’ of China. These individuals help propagate 
narratives favorable to the CCP. Chinese nationals, which have emigrated from China in the last 
30 years, are of particular interest to the CCP’s goal of promoting China abroad (Marie-Brady, 
2015). Many within this group, which in 2015 was around 10 million people, have a sense of 
loyalty to the CCP and therefore provide an efficient way for it to influence people and leaders in 
other countries (Marie-Brady, 2015). One instance of the CCP actively supporting Chinese 
nationals in influencing relations abroad is the speech made by politburo member Wang 
Zhaoguo in 2009 at the Eighth National Congress on Returned Overseas Chinese. He urged his 
audience of overseas Chinese to “unite closely with the CCP in advancing China’s national 
interests under the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Hua To, pg. 39, 2014).  
 The CCP does not apply overt force upon Chinese nationals, rather it prefers to ‘guide’ in 
lieu of leading. It encourages the overseas Chinese communities to think of their roles abroad 
as service to the Motherland but also as a mutually beneficial arrangement, whereby positive 
outcomes are assured their communities while at the same time the CCP is able to promote its 
agenda internationally. The goal is to have overseas Chinese assist the CCP by creating a 
“friendly environment in which Beijing can pursue its international interests, moderate anti-CCP 
activity, and promote pro-CCP goals” (Hua To, pg.39, 2014). In some cases, overseas Chinese 
have been known to participate in espionage activity at the behest of the CCP. For instance, in 
2007 the Royal Dutch Shell company uncovered a “special interest group” of Chinese nationals 
gathering after work hours. These Chinese nationals were encouraged by the CCP to obtain 
confidential pricing information for Royal Dutch Shell’s operations in Africa (Rossiter, 2007). 
According to the source, these individuals were compelled to help for what they claimed was the 
“good of the Motherland” (Rossiter, 2007). Espionage is still a tool employed by the CCP, but it 
is lessening in importance as sharp power methods are becoming more prevalent. The ultimate 
goal for engaging overseas Chinese nationals is that they will inadvertently and even proactively 
engage in activities and discussions which promote the CCP’s foreign policy goals (Mare-Brady, 
2015). Therefore, these Chinese nationals as well as ‘friends of China’ provide a necessary tie 
between the CCP and the outside world. 
 In the case of Australia, the work of the UFWD in connecting with Chinese nationals and 
influencing narratives to be positive to China have indeed begun to work. That is, of course, 
before the 2017 exposure of the CCP’s influence in Australia, which this essay will discuss 
below. However, before Australia changed its view of China, a Pew Research Center study 
published in 2017, found that 64% of Australians polled held a favorable view of China (Vice, 
2017). Two years previously, however, only 57% of Australians viewed China favorably (Vice, 
2017). In a relatively short amount of time, two years, Australians began to view China more 
favorably. This increasingly positive view of China is suggestive of the effects of China’s 
increased investments in international propaganda, of which the preceding pages will detail. In 
the case of Australia China’s sharp power investments would appear to have payed off, at least 
initially. (Vice, 2017).  
 Before addressing China’s sharp power efforts in Australia, one must distinguish whether 
China’s efforts are worth singling out. The efforts of the UFWD in conjunction with the CCP may 
not sound so dis-similar to the actions of other nations. However, the ways in which the UFWD 
works to influence, subvert, and manipulate political, media, and academic spheres in countries 
across the globe, in particularly that of New Zealand, Australia, Germany, and Argentina, is 
unique as China’s influence is growing. Certain efforts of the UFWD undermine the sovereignty 
and governance of countries and should demand further attention. Its actions are distinctive to 
the rule of the CCP and, therefore, contrary to its once sacrosanct policy of non-interference. In 
lieu of covering all the governments which China has influenced or attempted to influence 
through sharp power mechanisms, the remainder of this essay will focus on its involvement in 
the political spheres of Australia and Argentina.   
 
VII.   Evidence of Sharp Power in Australia’s Political Domains 
 “Espionage and foreign interference are occurring here [Australia] on an unprecedented 
scale, with the potential to cause serious harm to this nation’s sovereignty, its security, and . . . 
the integrity of our political system” (Dreyer, 2018). Duncan Lewis, head of Australia’s Security 
Investigation Organization (ASIO), gave this warning to the Australian government in June, 
2017. The Australia political system had been perforated by Chinese influence.  
 Since 2000, nearly 80% of foreign donations made to political parties in Australia were 
linked to China (Kurlantzick, 2017). Certain key political and well-connected Chinese nationals, 
living in Australia, have through these political donations and favors influenced actors and have 
served to undermine the sovereignty of Australia’s political system. One such instance is that 
involving Australia’s stance on the South China Sea. Officially, Australia has refrained from 
taking a stance in the maritime dispute and further has declined to join U.S.-led efforts towards 
freedom of navigation in the region. China claims historic rights over a large segment of the 
South China Sea but has received criticism from the international community because its claims 
go against the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or UNCLOS legislation. 
Australian officials, on the other hand, do not wish to offend their largest trading partner by 
siding against China and its claims over the sea. In 2017, the Australian Labor Party Senator 
Sam Dastyari told the Chinese media that “The South China Sea is China’s own affair. On this 
issue, Australia should remain neutral and respect China’s decision” (McKenzie, 2017). Without 
reference to the other Southeast Asia nations involved in the dispute, it was clear which side 
Dastyari was taking. He spoke only of the importance of upholding China’s decision in the 
matter.  
 It soon come to light that Dastyari had taken the pro-China position because of his 
relationship with Huang Xiangmo, a successful Chinese businessman living in Australia. Huang 
paid a legal bill of Dastyari’s back in 2014 and in return Destyari and his office had made four 
separate calls to Australia’s immigration office to expedite Huang’s path to citizenship. It is 
uncharacteristic of a political figure to attempt to sway the Australian citizenship department in 
favorably processing a citizenship request. However, Destyari was returning his favor to Huang 
Xiangmo. Despite Destyari’s efforts, the citizenship department did not give Huang Xiangmo 
citizenship. In June 2016, before Destyari’s statement about China’s claims in the South China 
Sea, Labor shadow defense spokesman Stephen Conroy denounced China’s actions in the 
South China Sea. Huang, aware of the CCP’s disapproval of Conroy’s comments, withdraw his 
promised donation of $400,000 to the Labor Party, Conroy’s party (McKenzie, 2017). It was then 
that Destyari showed his friendship to Huang and took the side of China, denouncing the 
statement of his colleague. A few days after Huang’s withdrawal of the $400,000 donation, he 
appeared at a Labor Party press conference. He requested that two Chinese businessmen be 
given the two remaining seats on the Labor Party’s senate ticket. The unspoken understanding 
was that he would re-gift the $400,000 to the Labor party if they agree to his stipulation. The 
Labor party acquiesced. However, the party publicly claimed the candidates were chosen based 
on merit and not because of the threat by Huang to withdraw his donation. Destyari was forced 
to step down as labor secretary only after the scandal of his financial ties with Huang Xiangmo 
came to light.    
 Huang is not an independent Chinese businessman but rather a businessman highly 
connected to the CCP. Huang moved to Australia in 2011 as owner of the Yuhu Investment 
Development Company in China (McKenzie, 2017). He is also the leader of the Australian arm 
of the Chinese Council for the Promotion of the Peaceful Reunification of China (CCPPRC) 
(McKenzie, 2017). While the CCPPRC may sound like a benign organization, its main goals are 
to undermine Taiwanese and Hong Kong independence movements and defend China’s claims 
in the South China Sea. The global headquarters of this organization are located in Beijing and 
it is overseen by the UFWD (Marie-Brady, 2015). Huang has claimed that his organization is a 
non-governmental organization and therefore is not an affiliate of the UFWD. However, Dr. Feng 
Chongyi, China academic and Communist party critic at Sydney University of Technology, says 
Huang is “a key member supported by the Chinese authorities, including the embassy or the 
consulate” (McKenzie, 2017).  
 In 2012, Huang began donating money to both the Liberal and Labor parties of Australia 
and since then has donated upwards of $2,692,960 (McKenzie, 2017). He began to ask for 
favors in 2013 in return for his donations. For instance, when in late 2012 he donated $500,000 
to the Labor Party, he implicitly requested that his friend Ernest Wong, a member of the 
Australian Chinese Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification of China, be placed in 
the vacant seat in Australia’s upper house (McKenzie, 2017). This, among other request, was 
accepted. His donations and ties to key political figures in Australian politics have recently 
brought him under considerable scrutiny by intelligence services in Australia. It is also the main 
reason why he has not been granted Australian citizenship.  
 Another noteworthy case of the CCP’s influence in Australian politics is that of Sheri Yan.   
Mrs. Yan, the former chief executive of the Global Sustainability Foundation, has deep 
connections with Australian politicians as well as top level connections with the CCP. She has 
built a reputation as someone able to open doors for Australian and U.S. business executives 
looking to access Communist Party cadres (Raymond, 2016). At the same time, she worked as 
a consultant for Chinese entrepreneurs who sought to make their fortunes overseas. In fact, she 
was a consultant for Dr. Chau Chak Wing, a billionaire Chinese property manager who, similar 
to that of Huang, has given over $4 million to the Australian Labor political party since 2006 
(McKenzie, 2017). Sheri Yan is married to Roger Uren, the former assistant secretary of the 
Office of National Assessment in Australia. Uren's office was tasked with briefing the Prime 
Minister on highly classified intelligence matters.  
 In October 2015, the Australian Security Intelligence Organization, ASIO, raided the 
apartment of Roger Uren and Sheri Yen. At the same time, in New York the FBI arrested Mrs. 
Yan and several Chinese business people for the charge of running a bribery racket in the 
United Nations (McKenzie, 2017). It soon came to light, that Mrs. Yan had paid kickbacks to the 
president of the UN General Assembly, John Ashe (Raymond, 2016). In return Ashe provided 
Yan with diplomatic appointments. As an affiliate of the CCP she was able to promote China’s 
agendas through these appointments (Raymond, 2016). Prosecutors estimate that General 
Assembly president Ashe took over $1.3 million in bribes from Chinese businessmen, in 
exchange for Ashe promoting their interests at the UN. $800,000 worth of those bribes were 
paid to Ashe through Yan’s foundation, when she served as the liaison between Ashe and the 
Chinese business people (Raymond, 2016). US District Attorney Preet Bharara said of Ashe in 
2016, “For Rolex watches, bespoke suits and a private basketball court, John Ashe, the 68th 
President of the UN General assembly, sold himself and the global institution he led,” 
(McKenzie, 2017). In addition, ASIO personnel found classified Australian documents in Yan 
and Uren’s apartment detailing what Western intelligence agencies knew of their Chinese 
counterparts (McKenzie, 2017). Uren, had removed the documents from his work at the Office 
of National Assessment before he retired. Uren is suspected to face charges for his removal of 
classified government documents. In 2016, John Ashe died, before being convicted of his 
crimes, however, Sheri Yan was charged and sentenced to 20 months in U.S. prison (Raymond, 
2016). 
 In light of these developments surrounding the CCP’s influence in the political system of 
Australia, Prime Minster Malcolm Turnball and his government have passed legislation which, 
among other things, bans donations from foreign bank accounts, non-citizens, and foreign 
entities to Australian political parties and candidates (Murphy, 2017). Australia before this move 
was among roughly a third of the countries in the world to allow foreign donations to political 
parties. While this is a positive step toward lessening Chinese sharp power interference 
methods, it does not solve the inherent problem with sharp power—that of its clandestine 
nature. It is difficult to distinguish soft power tactics from sharp power methods due to sharp 
powers covert nature. In addition, there is a lack of research done on the subject and therefore 
governments lack concrete knowledge on the subject. The Australian government has identified 
evidence of these methods by the CCP but now it faces another problem. It has the dilemma of 
managing relations with China so as not to create tension or sow seeds of distrust where 
transparency and dialogue may serve better. Currently, Australia has become more defensive in 
regard to China. Australia’s top intelligence agency has put more resources behind its 
investigation into Chinese influence (Kurlantzick, 2017). In the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper 
of Australia, the government also made it clear that it will increase its efforts to maintain the 
United States’ presence in Asia, and strengthen ties with neighboring democracies (Foreign 
Policy, 2017). It is clear that Australia is seeking to balance its relationship with China by 
reaching out to other nations. In this sense, the CCP’s efforts to increase its influence in 
Australia have not come to fruition. Perhaps, the discovery of the CCP’s efforts in other 
countries will convince Chinese government officials to retain soft power methods and relinquish 
their increasing use of sharp power. Only time will tell.  
 Another step taken by Australia along with India, Japan, and the United States was the 
commencement of talks surrounding the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, more 
commonly known as the Quad. The Quad was a strategic dialogue between the aforementioned 
countries in 2007, which in essence was a response to China’s increased military and economic 
power. It dissolved within a year, in part because of the negative response from China, which 
saw the Quad as little more than an effort to contain and control its rise. However, in November 
2017 senior officials from Japan, Australia, India, and the U.S. met after the East Asia Summit in 
Manila to discuss a possible reconvening of the Quad (Talukdar, 2017). The dialogue on the 
Quad this time around was centered on a push toward multilateralism, bringing together “like-
minded democracies” (Talukdar, 2017). Its main initiative is to “deepen security cooperation 
between the countries and provide alternatives for financing regional infrastructure programs to 
that of China” (Reuters Staff, 2018). Australia has shown growing interest in this alliance, 
contrary to the previous round of talks, as it was the first country to balk at China’s response 
and withdraw its membership. This time around Australia is undeterred by the reaction of China. 
It is taking a more cautious approach because of its recent encounter with China and its use of 
sharp power in the Australian political system. As mentioned in the Foreign Policy White 
Papers, Australia seeks to diversify its trade and investment portfolio, which this alliance would 
offer, because it no longer sees reason in remaining so dependent on China (Wyeth, 2017). 
 One may assume that the threat to Australia’s political system is consequential only to 
Australia. However, the threat to Australia has reverberating effects upon other nations of the 
world. For instance, Australia and New Zealand are part of the Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance 
which also includes the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada (Kurlantzick, 2017). If the 
CCP is able to influence and infiltrate the political systems of Australia and New Zealand, the 
sensitive security information of the other nations are at risk. While Australia has taken 
measures to curb CCP influence in its political sphere, New Zealand has yet to act (Marie-
Brady, 2015). A compromise to one nation’s political system has international ramifications. 
Political leaders, journalists, and foreign affairs specialists must be more aware of so-called 
independent organizations which claim to have no ties to the CCP. In today’s world, those 
representing and pushing for the agenda of the CCP no longer present themselves as 
government officials.  
   
VIII. Evidence of Sharp Power in Argentina   
 Unlike Australia, China has only recently, within the last six years, increased its 
involvement in Argentina. China’s efforts at person-to-person diplomacy, infrastructure 
investments, and cultivation of political parties have increased China’s influence in Argentina. It 
has garnered support from all sectors of Argentinian society, through its initiatives in the 
political, media, and academic spheres of Argentina. One Chinese analyst in Buenos Aires 
explained that “To consolidate its [China’s] position in the country, they cannot look scary” 
(Cardenal, 2017). China has done just that, it has used its economic success to cultivate friendly 
relations with individuals and organizations in Argentina. One of the major reasons it was able to 
increase its investment in Argentina was due to the deterioration of Argentina’s economy. The 
two-former presidents Néstor Kirchner and Christina Kirchner, who governed Argentina from 
2003 until 2015, had implemented protectionist economic policies. When the global economic 
crisis of 2008 took hold, these protectionist policies, and many other factors led to the 
deterioration of the economy and strained investment within Argentina (Cardenal, 2017). With 
growing foreign debt, China’s offer to stabilize the Argentina economy was well received. In 
2014, the two countries signed a bilateral agreement for a three-year swap of Argentina’s $11 
billion debt (Peters 2015). China was key in that moment because the bilateral agreement 
prevented Argentina from defaulting on its foreign debts. As part of the agreement, Argentina 
agreed to give preferential treatment to Chinese suppliers and laborers as well as investors in 
Argentina’s large infrastructure projects of the future (Peters, 2015). China seized the 
opportunity to increase its investment in Argentina, and soon after the agreement announced its 
decision to begin a comprehensive strategic partnership with Argentina, a relationship which 
only four other Latin America countries enjoy with China (Cardenal, 2017). The Christina 
Kirchner administration signed numerous accords with China the year following 2014 
concerning development and trade. This was the beginning of China’s increased influence in 
Argentina. In 2015, elections brought Mauricio Macri into power. Since his election, Macri has 
further enhanced bilateral relations between the two countries. In 2017, for example, when 
Macri visited Beijing on official business, the two leaders signed a number of new agreements 
further strengthening Argentina’s ties with China (Cardenal, 2017). Political elites in Argentina 
agree that closer relations with China is imperative to increase the positive infrastructure 
development of their country (Cardenal, 2017).  
 Chinese leaders have helped foster this support for the CCP in part through their 
increased cultivation of Argentinian political leaders. They have not only developed ties with the 
Front for Victory, a party which shares similar ideological stances as that of the CCP, but also 
with the Republican Proposal Party (PRO), the opposition party to the Front for Victory. How 
has China cultivated relationships with political parties in Argentina? Firstly, through meetings 
held in Beijing. One Argentinian academic described these meetings as consisting “of pompous 
statements, a picture, and little more” (Cardenal, 2017). The CCP, through these trips, lavishes 
Argentinian politicians with all kinds of perks, making sure to present its tailor-made version of 
China. It is important to note that not only are politicians invited to these China trips, but so too 
are Argentinian elites and civic leaders (Cardenal, 2017). The connection is made by the 
Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, a CCP controlled 
organization, which engages with Argentinian entrepreneurs and societal leaders (Cardenal, 
2017). While this is a form of soft power diplomacy, on the part of the CCP, the potential 
motives behind these trips cross the line into sharp power. One must wonder why, if these 
meetings lack substance, the CCP would conduct them on such a frequent scale. In part 
because it seeks to encourage political elites to support its policies. It does this through the 
manipulation of the China narrative. Argentinian leaders are only exposed to the success stories 
of China and not the scandals: Chinese firms stealing intellectual property rights or the 
government using Chinese nationals to extract information from intelligence services or 
companies, as is the case of Australia, etc. Certain Argentinian politicians may support China’s 
policies abroad because China has invested heavily within their country. Others have become 
favorably disposed towards China through these China trips and so continue to develop closer 
ties with the nation. One has to wonder what these closer ties with China will mean in the future. 
Perhaps, China will place pressure on Argentina to act in accordance to certain CCP agendas 
or perhaps there is no other ulterior motivate than to enhance bilateral relations. Again, only 
time will tell, but the growing dependence Argentina has on China economically is something 
which is likely to bear fruit for one country more than the other.  
 Another striking piece of evidence for the recent uptick in China’s efforts to influence, 
comes from its investment in helping to develop the next generation of political leaders. The 
Contemporary Foundation, based in Buenos Aires, develops leaders for the center-right parties. 
Every year this foundation has two to four, 10-20-day long training sessions in China hosted by 
the Communist Youth League of China (Cardenal, 2017). At these trainings, the Communist 
Youth League, an organization controlled by the CCP, teaches youth Argentinians about 
China’s rich history, economic prowess, and size. All the while, the emphasis is placed on the 
legitimization of the Chinese communist system (Cardenal, 2017). No word is spoken about 
China’s domestic restrictions or interference in other countries. Another such organization which 
is influenced by the CCP is the Latin America Center for Political and Economic Chinese 
Studies (CLEPEC) located in Buenos Aires. China awards young researchers and recent 
graduates, at this organization, scholarships to study in China (Cardenal, 2017). The tactic is 
nothing new, as many countries sponsor researchers to come and study in their countries. 
However, once these graduates return to Argentina they are encouraged, and often do, offer 
courses and training sessions on China (Cardenal, 2017). They offer these courses to academic 
institutions and provincial government leaders all across Argentina (Cardenal, 2017). In 2016, 
CLEPEC had taught 20 courses to some 2,200 public servants and students according to the 
foundations website (Cardenal, 2017). One CLEPEC executive stated that “our future leaders 
need to have a better knowledge of what China is” when speaking about the importance of the 
exchange. It is true that these graduates provide information about China which many within 
Argentina lack. However, the type of narrative that these CLEPEC researchers are propagating 
is biased by the fact that their sponsorship comes from the CCP and as such, they are only 
exposed to the party narrative. They, similar to the leaders who join the CCP China trips, 
receive manipulated information. They disseminate the information they are given and in turn 
share only a segment of the truth. This is evidence by the fact that graduates of CLEPEC are 
known for sympathizing with the Chinese state-managed system (Cardenal, 2017). These two 
Argentinian based organizations with strong ties to China and CCP officials are two instances of 
how the CCP is actively cultivating relationships with influential and soon-to-be influential 
leaders in Argentina. China’s motivation to influence and create sympathetic, to the Chinese 
state system, future leaders in Argentina moves from soft power to something else. These 
young researchers and politicians regard the CCP more favorably than others who have not 
received the same amount of attention from the CCP. Therefore, partnering with local 
organizations in Argentina is another way the CCP has increased its influence in the country.  
 One of the defining features of sharp power influence is the use of deception and the 
manipulation of information to change narratives. As previously mentioned with regard to the 
trips to China and CCP supported political organizations, the CCP has accomplished this aim of 
censoring certain information to ensure that an overall positive image of itself is propagated to 
important visitors. One such example of the direct impact that this tactic has on the Argentinian 
population is that of the intersection of people-to-people diplomacy and think tank sponsorship. 
China has begun to develop its relations with think tanks in Argentina as well as internationally 
(Doyon, 2016). The CCP uses think tanks to help disseminate views favorable to the CCP. Two 
notable think tanks in Argentina which have good relations with the CCP are the Argentine 
Council for International Relations (CARI) and the Center for the Implementation of Public 
Policies for Equity and Growth (CIPPEC) (Cardenal, 2017). Members of the CARI think tank 
view China not as an authoritarian regime but instead as a consultive democracy (Schelp and 
Saravia, 2016). The term consultive democracy was coined by Xi Jinping in 2014 to describe 
China’s form of governing. It allows for the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
members, comprised of communist and non-communist affiliated politicians, to take part in the 
critique of party policies (Changyu, 2015). In essence, it is a way for only a small group of 
Chinese elites to provide feedback. However, the views of these individuals are almost always 
in-line with the party ideology. It is worth noting that while leaders from Western countries see 
China as authoritarian, certain Argentinian leaders see China as a consultive democracy—a 
term Xi Jinping used to describe China’s political system.  
 At a seminar held by CARI in May 2016, a number of influential elites spoke of the 
importance of Argentina’s continued relations with China. Dr. Jorge Malena, the director of 
Contemporary China studies at the University of Salvador, stated that China was the only nation 
capable of superseding the United States (Schelp and Saravia, 2016). He went on to claim that 
when China overtakes the United States, the world will become a world of “great harmony led 
by the South” (Schelp and Saravia, 2016). He finished by distinguishing China from the Western 
world in that China does not seek worldwide hegemony or have the “incentive to build a new 
world order” (Schelp and Saravia, 2016). Dr. Malena, similar to other leaders in Argentina, 
expresses a favorable view of China. He assumes to know with certainty that China will not 
seek world hegemony which is a bit presumptuous as he is not a member of Xi Jinping’s 
politburo. While it may overstate the case to assert that China seeks dominance, it is also 
presumptions to assume China’s current rhetoric, of harmony with the world, will not evolve into 
something more aggressive, especially if circumstances and unforeseen events change the 
course of international politics.  
 Another case of the CCP’s indirect influence in Argentina is that of Gustavo Girado. 
Girado is a prominent economist and sinologist in Argentina who has published a book on 
China’s history and has acted as a consultant for leading politicians in Argentina concerning 
China and the CCP (Capotondo, 2017). In an interview discussing his recent book How did the 
Chinese do it?, he claimed that many Argentinians have little to no knowledge about China and 
the CCP outside of CCP sponsored Chinese festivals in the country (Capotondo, 2017). He said 
that knowledge about the “importance of China is fairly homogenized at the popular level”, 
meaning most of the Argentine population has a similar and basic view of China (Capotondo, 
2017). He went on to say that China influences Argentina in ways imperceivable to most people 
(Capotondo, 2017). Girado acknowledged the fact that the general public has little 
understanding of China and CCP rule, yet China’s influence on them is a daily occurrence: 
whether that influence be from advertisements, Chinese news in Spanish, cultural events, 
Chinese colleges, etc. The CCP is controlling the way in which Argentinians gain more 
knowledge of China.  
 In another article, from China Military News, Girado was quoted as favoring China’s 
position in the South China Sea dispute (Jianing, 2016). He stated that the actions of the 
Philippines to involve the court of arbitration is “an inappropriate approach” to solving the 
problem (Jianing, 2016). He then went on to side with China by saying “it is reasonable that 
China does not accept the arbitration” (Jianing, 2016). Girado is one of only a few Argentinian 
China experts living in Argentina. He has held positions in the Ministry of the Economy, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Agriculture in Argentina (Liascovich, 2016). The 
public as well as leaders, politicians, and business people look to Girado and the other few 
experts to inform them on matters relating to China. He portrays a consistently positive view of 
China and its policy initiatives when informing Argentinian leaders and people (Liascovich, 
2016). He is quoted in a number of articles from Xinhua News as well as the People’s Daily 
dating back to 2015. Xinhua News and People’s Daily, are online news source which are 
directly under the control of the CCP and are part of Xi’s move to create a global Chinese 
presence (Marie-Brady, 2015). Both News sources use Gustavo Girado as a mouthpiece, 
directed at English, Spanish, and Chinese audiences, for legitimizing CCP policies. Therefore, 
Girado is an example of how the CCP uses ‘friends of China’ to propagate and advocate on its 
behalf within other countries. However, since Girado is not directly affiliated with the CCP he 
provides independent legitimacy to the CCP which someone such as Huang from Australia 
cannot.  
 “A critical, internal debate in Argentina that is broad and clarifying about the influence of 
the ‘China factor’ is an unresolved matter” (Cardenal ,2017). While these efforts may on the 
surface seem an extension of effective diplomatic policy by China, there exists an underlining 
concern: that China’s soft power efforts are moving into the territory of sharp power. 
Manipulation of information and one-sided narratives from the CCP are influencing political and 
academic elites in Argentina. The extent to which the CCP narrative will influenced policy in 
Argentina remains to be seen. Horacio Reyser, the Argentinian Secretary of International 
Economic Affairs said in November of 2017 that “there is an increase in interest [in China and 
Russia] and we encourage it because it seems very positive, it does not generate a conflict” 
(Misculin, 2018). Despite the lack of worry by Argentinian leaders, it is important for local think 
tanks, researchers, and foreign policy experts to continue monitoring the situation and update 
Argentinian leaders on the developments of China’s sharp power mechanisms. Perhaps China’s 
influence in Argentina will remain benign and perhaps nothing will come of their sharp power 
methods. However, despite the uncertainty of China’s motives it is still important to encourage a 
balanced dialogue. Transparency and acknowledgement of the situation are the most effective 
ways to prevent potential threats to national sovereignty. Argentinian politics have not reached 
the same stage of CCP influence as that of Australia, however, with time Argentina’s 
relationship with China may sour to a similar fate.  
  
IX. China’s Response to Sharp Power Allegations  
 China has denounced the very idea that it is manipulating public and political perceptions 
abroad. With regard to Australia, criticism of how Australia has handled the situation has been 
quite apparent from Chinese media. In the Global Times, a CCP affiliated online news source, 
an op-ed was published in December 2017 which called the claims of China’s interference in 
Australian politics as “disgraceful” and “symptoms of McCarthyism” (West, 2017). By equating 
the accusations to those of McCarthyism, the Global Times is attempting to erode the credibility 
of Australian news. The initial attempts by the Chinese media are to undermine Australian 
accusers while at the same time asserting China as a peaceful and non-interfering nation. After 
the revelation of the CCP’s influence in Australia, Nick Bisley, Professor of International 
Relations at La Trobe University, went to China for an academic conference. He spent a week 
in China in December 2017 speaking with Chinese scholars, analysts, and commentators at an 
academic conference hosted by the CCP (Bisley, 2017). At the conference, he noted that 
Chinese elites had reactions ranging from “puzzlement to outright hostility” for Australia’s 
reaction towards China. (Bisley, 2017). Bisley commented that many of the individuals had 
studied in Australia, sent their children there, and generally had a good disposition toward 
Australia (Bisley, 2017). However, many were discouraged by the sinister tone and 
sensationalization of the situation by Australian media. However, Bisley made a point of noting 
that at these types of conferences, hosted by the CCP, Chinese elites must show they are on 
the same page as Xi Jinping (Bisley, 2017). Therefore, it is possible these individuals were 
constricted from expressing their full opinions. However, it is clear that CCP proponents are 
discouraged by Australia’s portrayal of China’s policies abroad.  
 Australia’s steps to curb CCP influence in their political system have affected Chinese 
citizens living in China, as evidence by a 2017 poll by the Chinese state-owned news portal 
huanqiu.com rating Australia as the least friendly country towards China (Wong, 2018). The poll 
asked Chinese citizens to choose the least friendly country to China and Australia received 60% 
of the votes or 8,589 votes (Wong, 2018). The CCP disapproval of Australia’s reaction is now 
manifest in the population of China who perceive Australia as being less friendly to China and 
Chinese citizens. China’s state media has advised students not to enroll in Australian higher 
education and PRC delegations have cancelled visits to Australia (Lo, 2018). As a result, less 
Chinese citizens are sending their children to colleges in Australia, preferring to send their 
children to America or Europe instead.     
 Other Chinese scholars have attempted to clarify the CCP’s new role of increasingly 
clandestine soft power. According to senior propaganda official Hu Xiaohan, “The struggle for 
and against infiltration in the ideological sphere has become intense and complex. Hostile 
forces have whipped up successive waves of public opinion against China, and the international 
struggle for public opinion grows fiercer by the day”. (Edney, pg.77, 2014). Indeed, in Australia 
Chinese-Australians are experiencing the most criticism. Many Chinese-Australians who speak 
with a moderate or positive view of China are labelled as “CCP sympathizers”, “Beijing trolls”, 
and “panda huggers” (Lo, 2018). These individuals are reluctant to share their opinions publicly 
because of the sentiments expressed by Australians against them (Lo, 2018). On the other side, 
Chinese-Australians who oppose the way the CCP has been involved in Australia are hesitant 
to speak publicly because they fear retaliation from the CCP (Lo, 2018). As a result, Chinese-
Australians are experiencing most of the negative reciprocation of the CCP’s influence in 
Australia. The way in which Chinese-Australians have been excluded from the dialogue in 
Australia will only hinder relations and cause more paranoia. Individuals cannot disregard 
certain Chinese nationals simply because they have opposing views. Open dialogue must be 
encouraged, more than ever, because unaddressed resentment will only serve to divide the 
nation further.   
    
X. Conclusion 
 The amount of power with which China has to influence other nations, merely because of 
its economic and political ties, is a reality that must not be overlooked. China seeks to be a 
responsible international power, but its domestic situation must not be forgotten because it is 
misguided to assume that China will uphold the values on the world stage which is does not 
uphold domestically. Why would the CCP support independent media abroad when it restricts 
and controls its domestic media? Therefore, nations must consider more carefully the situations 
in which CCP narratives are propagated through independent international media because it is 
possible that sharp power mechanisms are at play. The potential ramifications of China’s 
influence in other countries should draw the attention of politicians and leaders because there is 
a possibility for their national sovereignty to be at risk. It is not necessarily the specific instances 
of sharp power which should cause alarm but rather the culmination of sharp power efforts 
which becomes problematic. Or perhaps sharp power is the way of the future and a world in 
which narratives are tailored and demented by governments is the reality we must all expect. 
Perhaps transparency will no longer be a desired quality of nations and rather the manipulation 
of the truth which reasserts a nations dominance in the world is the likely eventuality. Perhaps, 
in order to outsmart China, playing by the rules of its game is the only possibility. Perhaps it is 
as Orwell wrote in 1984, “Who controls the past controls the future, who controls the present 
controls the past”. By that logic whoever controls the narrative of the present controls the future. 
Sharp power has the potential to do just that. If China and other authoritarian regimes are able 
to control the present narrative so much so that public and governmental perceptions of the past 
are changed, then they have the potential to control the future. I, however, do not accept that 
possibility. The only way to identify CCP influence, or for that matter any nations sharp power 
efforts, is through increased transparency and dialogue. Building barriers instead of constructing 
pathways of open communication will only increase the likelihood of the CCP and other nations 
involvement in covert influence.  
 It is important, however, to expose CCP sharp power methods without causing increased 
paranoia or aggression. This is particularly true in the case of Chinese nationals who have taken 
no part in China’s sharp power methods. Chinese nationals will turn to the nation which accepts 
them and not the nation which blames them for actions they themselves have not committed. 
That is why bringing this issue to the forefront of public dialogue is the only way to strengthen 
security and ensure all sides of the debate are heard. Nations should not fall into the same 
pattern as China, silencing differing perspectives because that will only seek to divide. Rather, 
nations must continue to encourage research, the search for truth, and continue to value the 
democratic system. As Nye writes, “openness is a key source of democracies’ ability to attract 
and persuade” (Nye, How sharp power, 2018). Relinquishing that openness from democracies 
would be to give up our most important asset, because the possibility of a future without 
transparency and open dialogue is not a future any of us should wish to see.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
XI. Glossary 
Hard Power: influence by coercion and or force, economic sanctions and military intervention. 
Sharp Power: Authoritarian regimes perforate the political and information spheres of other 
nations in order to deceive and manipulate public and governmental perceptions and 
agendas to ultimately be favorable to their policies.  
Soft Power: Cultural and social initiatives by a foreign government to create favorable opinions 
of it abroad. 
Western World: The West, geographically, including Europe and parts of Africa. Usually those 
which have democratic styles of governments. 
 
 
XII. Acronyms 
ASIO: Australia’s Security Investigation Organization 
CCP/China (used synonymously in this paper): Chinese Communist Party. 
CLEPEC: Latin America Center for Political and Economic Chinese Studies 
OFP/SCIO: Central Office of Propaganda (OFP), known more broadly as the State Council 
Information Office (SCIO) of the CCP. 
UFWD: United Front Work Department of the CCP 
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